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Abstract: 
This paper proposes a model that accounts for “export platform” FDI – a form of FDI that 
is common in the data but rarely discussed in the theoretical literature. Unlike the 
previous literature, this paper’s theory nests all the typical modes of supply, including 
exports, horizontal and vertical FDI, horizontal and vertical export platform FDI. The 
theory yields the testable hypothesis that a decrease in either inter-regional or 
intra-regional trade costs induces firms to choose export platform FDI. The empirical 
analysis provides descriptive statistics which point to large proportions of third country 
exports of US FDI, and an econometric analysis, whose results are in line with the 
model’s predictions. The last section suggests policy implications for nations seeking to 
attract FDI.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The complexity of modes of foreign direct investment (FDI) has recently been discussed in the 
literature. The old framework of horizontal and vertical FDI does not represent well the actual modes 
of FDI. Firms set up plants not only to supply the host country’s market but also the host nation’s 
neighbouring countries. For example, many tobacco companies have their European headquarters 
and plants in Switzerland. The world’s largest Vinyl Chrolide Mononer 1  producer, Shinetsu 
Chemical has its plants in Portugal and supplies all European countries from there. In Far East Asia, 
parts and components are produced and shipped back and forth among many countries in the region2 
before they are sold as final products.  
To see if export platform type FDI is an important phenomenon, we have computed the ratio of 
exports to third countries over the total sales of US FDI3 (Figure 1). We have taken the top 20 
countries with the largest US FDI stock in 2008, the most recent year for which data are available. 
Countries are ordered by the US FDI stock amount. The United Kingdom is the largest recipient of 
US FDI, followed by the Netherlands. We notice that small countries, such as the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Ireland, Switzerland, Belgium, Singapore and Hong Kong have high ratios of exports 
to third countries, ranging from about 40 to 70 percent. Large EU countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany and Spain exhibit 20 to 30 percent. On the other hand, also large but 
non-EU countries, which do not have neighbouring countries of similar income level, such as China 
and Japan show rather small numbers. These findings imply export platform FDI is prevalent in 
countries (especially small countries) which have neighbouring countries of similar income level and 
also that the EU might have induced export platform type FDI by reducing intra-regional trade costs 
within EU countries. 
                                                 
1 A basic raw material for plastics used mainly for construction 
2 For production/distribution networks in East Asia, see Ando and Kimura (2005a,b) 
3 We define the third country exports as the total sales minus the sum of the domestic sales and the 
exports to the USA. 
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This paper constructs a model with export platform FDI. Unlike previous theoretical work it attempts 
to nest all types of FDI in one model. The model shows that a reduction in trade costs, either 
inter-regional and/or intra-regional, induces firms to choose export platform FDI rather than other 
modes of supply. The empirical part of the paper corroborates this theoretical prediction, using US 
outward FDI.  
Figure 1: Third country export ratios of the top 20 US FDI recipient countries 
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Source: Author’s computation from the data of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
Literature 
Many economists argue that the modes of supply of multinational firms are more complex than the 
pioneering works of horizontal and vertical FDI by Helpman and Krugman (1985). Unlike the usual 
model of FDI (Markusen (2002)), in which horizontal FDI is a substitute for trade, Bergstrand and 
Egger (2007) develop a model where horizontal FDI coexists with trade between identical countries. 
Yeaple (2003) constructs a model where a firm may engage both in horizontal and vertical FDI, for a 
medium range of trade costs.  
The literature on export-platform FDI is surveyed by Greenaway and Kneller (2007). As it appears in 
this survey paper, Motta and Norman (1996) is probably the first paper to theoretically deal with the 
export platform FDI. It assumes three identical countries with identical production costs and a single 
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stage of production, but with differing trade costs. If two of the three countries form Free trade 
agreement, the outside country may opt to build a plant inside the FTA bloc and export to the other 
country in the bloc. In this model, because of identical costs neither of the inside countries choose 
export platform FDI as a strategy. Ekholm et al. (2007) construct a partial equilibrium model in which 
there are two countries, East (E) and West (W) in Northern region, with one firm in each country and 
one country S in Southern region with no firm. Production is essentially one stage, but having 
multiple plants incurs additional costs (fixed or marginal). The key assumption to drive the export 
platform FDI is a lower cost in S. It analyzes the conditions under which E and/or W firms uses S to 
produce for (a) exporting back to the home country (home-country export platform), (b) exporting to 
the other Northern country (third-country export platform), or (c) export to both (global export 
platform). They also show empirically that US firms in Europe have higher shares of third country 
exports than US firms in other areas. Baltagi et al. (2007), using spatial econometrics, show a 
significant third country effects on FDI locations, namely neighbouring countries’ characteristics 
matter for inward FDI. Blonigen et al. (2007), in an analysis similar to Baltagi et al. (2007), examine 
third countries’ effects on the choice of FDI type but uses third countries’ market potential as a major 
explanatory variable. Whereas firms are atomistic in all the above models, Grossman et al. (2006), 
motivated by the observation that various modes of supply coexist within the same industry (Hanson 
et al. (2001) and Feinberg and Keane (2003)), constructs a model, where firms face a richer array of 
modes of supply, by allowing for firm heterogeneity and by incorporating several types of 
complementarities, first pointed out by Yeaple (2003). A model close to ours is built by Neary (2009), 
which is also based on “proximity-concentration” trade-off. Murázová and Neary (2010) develops a 
general model of how a firm will choose to serve a group of foreign markets by exports or FDI, and 
how many foreign plants it will want to establish, using supermodularity concept. Ours is different 
from theirs in that it includes not only horizontal export platform but also vertical export platform. 
The newness of this paper is on two fronts. On the theoretical side, following Navaretti and Venables 
(2004) framework, it develops a model which nests all modes of supply. A nice feature of Navaretti 
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and Venables’ framework is the use of more general assumptions than those of Ekholm et al. (2007). 
This paper incorporates the option of decomposing the production process into Navaretti and 
Venables’ framework. By doing so, the model includes horizontal export platform FDI and vertical 
export platform FDI.4 While this paper’s model has a drawback of not yielding co-existence of 
several modes of supply within the same industry, which is one of Grossman et al. (2006)’s 
contributions, its virtue lies in its simple structure.  
The other contribution is on the empirical side. Baltagi et al. (2007) and Blonigen et al. (2007) use 
total FDI stock as the dependent variable without distinguishing between types of FDI. However, 
third country effects should have come from the potentiality of third country exports. Thus, in order to 
better capture the third country effects, this paper uses FDI stocks multiplied by the third country 
export ratio as the dependent variables and attempts to explain the determinants of export platform 
FDI.  
Section 2 develops the model that structures our empirical exercise. Section 3 explains the data, 
estimation equation and results. The final section concludes. 
2. MODEL 
We extend the model developed by Navaretti and Venables (2004) to 2-regions 2-countries and 
include the possibility of export platform FDI.  
a. Countries and modes of supply 
There are two regions, for example, North America and Europe. Each consists of 2 countries. The 
production process comprises two stages: components and assembly. Firms can decompose these two 
stages of component and assembly by paying a ‘decomposition cost’. So-called “Iceberg trade costs” 
are incurred when component and/or assembly are transported. To deliver one unit of good from one 
country to the other within a region requires that 1 t+  units be shipped out. We denote 1 t t+ º   
                                                 
4 The definition of these types of FDI is in the next section. 
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(Iceberg trade cost). Intercontinental transportation of one unit between two regions requires 
1 I It t+ º  to be shipped out. 
Two regions and two countries in each region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Black arrows represent iceberg trade cost within regions, t , and iceberg trade cost between regions, It . 
Firms choose a mode of supply from the following five types.  
Modes of supply 
1. n (national) type: Firms have only one component plant (C) and one assembly plant (A) in their 
Home country and export to the neighbouring country and to the nations in the other continent.  
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A & C indicate where assembly plants and component plants are located. Blue coloured arrows represent the flow of 
assembled goods (final goods).  
2. m (horizontal multinational) type: Firms have a set of a component plant and an assembly plant in 
Home country and another set in the other country in Home region and in the two nations of the 
other continent. In other words, firms have both of assembly and components plants in all the four 
countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is no flow of assembled goods (final goods) because production of component and assembly are both done in 
each country. 
3. v (vertical multinational) type: Firms have a component plant in its Home country and have an 
assembly plant in each of 4 countries.  
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Green arrows represent the flow of components. 
 
4. Hxp (horizontal export platform) type: Firms have a component plant and an assembly plant at 
Home to supply both Home and the other country in its own region, and also have a set of  
component and assembly plants in one of the symmetric countries in the other region to supply 
both countries in the other region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Vxp (vertical export platform): Firms have a set of component and assembly plants at Home to 
supply Home and the other country in its own region. For the other region, they have an assembly 
plant in one of the symmetric countries in the region to supply both countries in the foreign region.  
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b. Operating profit 
As in Navaretti and Venables (2004), the operating profit of firm k in county i is expressed as:  
 k k ki i i is R sp e é ù= ë û  (1) 
where iR  represents the market size of country i, 
k k k
i i i is p q Rº  the firm’s market share ( p , q  
represent price and quantity respectively), and k ki ise e é ù= ë û  each firm’s perceived elasticity of 
demand, which depends only on the market share of the firm. The derivation is in the appendix A. 
c. Fixed costs 
Any type of firm pays H (firm specific fixed cost, or headquarter cost). To produce the good, they 
incur F (Plant specific fixed cost) which includes component plant fixed cost Fc, and assembly plant 
fixed cost Fa. They can decompose these two stages of component and assembly by paying a 
‘decomposition cost’, D. Then, fixed costs incurred by each mode of supply are:  
1. n-type: H                +         Fc  + Fa 
Firm specific                  Plant specific fixed 
      fixed cost at home country     cost at home country  
2. m-type:  H               +         4 (Fc  +  Fa)                
Firm specific                  Sum of plant specific fixed               
      fixed cost at home country     costs in 4 countries  
3. v-type:   H              +           Fc   +   Fa        +      3 (Fa  +  D)                        
 
Firm specific               Plant specific fixed        Assembly plant fixed cost                
         fixed cost at home country  costs in home country     at N2, E1 and E2 
4. Hxp-type: H         +      Fc  +  Fa         +  Fc  +   Fa 
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Firm specific       Plant specific fixed    Plant specific fixed 
        fixed cost at Home  cost at Home         cost in a country (eg. E1) of the foreign region 
5. Vxp-type: H         +     Fc  +  Fa       +     Fa  + D 
       Firm specific      Plant specific fixed     Plant specific fixed       
       fixed cost at Home  cost at Home         cost in a country (eg. E1) of the foreign region                               
For the sake of simplicity, we assume the four countries have identical market sizes and all firms have 
identical marginal costs and face identical fixed costs. Multinationals producing in country i have 
exactly the same market share as national firms. Imported goods have less market shares due to trade 
costs t  and It . Using f , the freeness of trade (Baldwin et al. (2003)), which is easier to handle 
mathematically than iceberg trade costs t 5, I define i js f  as the market share in country i of a 
supplier from country j.  
d. Profit 
Since we assume symmetry of countries and firms as mentioned above, profits of firms choosing each 
mode of supply can be expressed as follows.  
/ / / / ( )n a a aI ISR S R S R S R H Fc Fas f s f s f sP = + + + - + +  (2) 
))(4(//// FaFcHSRSRSRSRm ++-+++=P ssss  (3) 
))(3(//// DFaFaFcHRSRSRSSR cI
c
I
cv ++++-+++=P sjsjsjs  (4) 
)(//// FaFcFaFcHRSSRRSSR aaHxp ++++-+++=P sjssjs  (5) 
/ / / / ( )Vxp a c c aI ISR S R S R S R H Fc Fa Fa Ds f s f s f f sP = + + + - + + + +  (6) 
                                                 
5 To be precise, 1 sf t -º , where s  is the parameter of constant elasticity of substitution in CES 
utility function, i.e., ( )
( )1/ 1 1
1 1
1
N
i
i
U C
s
s
-
-
=
æ ö= ç ÷
è ø
å . 
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where S, R and s  represent the market share, the market size and the firm’s perceived elasticity of 
demand. Due to the symmetry assumption above, neither subscript nor superscript is attached to S 
and R. The firm’s perceived elasticity of demand, kie  does not need either superscript or subscript. I 
change the term to s  to link it to the constant elasticity of CES utility function, which is explained in 
footnote 5. The first term of each equation represents the operating profit the firm earns in its home 
market (N1 in the above figure). The second term represents the operating profit in the other country 
within the same region (N2 in the above figure). The third term is the operating profit in one of the 
two countries in the foreign region (E1 in the above figure). The fourth term is the operating profit in 
the other country in the foreign region (E2 in the above figure). The difference in profits between 
firms comes from the difference in market shares, which are affected by the freeness of trade f , and 
in fixed costs. For example in equation (6), the firm’s share in the home country is S  while it is aSf  
in the neighbouring country because the firm incurs the trade cost associated with the transport of 
assembly from N1 to N2. In E1, the market share is cISf  because component is to be transported to 
E1 from N1, “eroding” the market share. Finally in E2, it is c aISf f  because the full market share S, 
which firms could enjoy if they produced the product within the market country, is first eroded by cIf , 
the transport of component from N1 to E1 and then by af , the transport of assembly from E1 to E2.6 
Assuming monopolistic competition, free entry drives profits to zero. We can derive the boundary 
conditions between each mode of supply from the above profit equations from (2) to (6). 
e. The boundary conditions 
The boundary conditions in equilibrium between two modes of supply can be found from the profit 
equations. Because of zero profit conditions, a particular mode of supply is the equilibrium choice 
when it yields zero profits while the other mode of supply yields negative profits. The boundary 
                                                 
6 The “erosion” effects in the form of multiplicative terms, as cISf  and 
c a
ISf f , are derived in the 
appendix.  
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conditions of all pairs of modes of supply are summarized in Table 1. The derivation process is in the 
appendix A. 
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Table 1: Ten boundary conditions 
 n-type m-type Hxp-type v-type Vxp-type 
n-type NA 32
4( )
a a
I
H
H Fc Fa
f f+ >
+ +
 1
1 2 2( )
a
a a
I
H Fc Fa Fc Fa
H Fc Fa
f
f f
+ + + + +
<
+ + + +
 
1 2 3( )
1 2
c c
I
a a
I
H Fc Fa Fa D
H Fc Fa
f f
f f
+ + + + + +
<
+ ++ +
 1
1 2
a c c a
I I
a a
I
H Fc Fa Fa D
H Fc Fa
f f f f
f f
+ + + + + + +
<
+ + + +
 
m-type  NA 
)(4 FaFcH
Ha
++
<j  3( 4( ))2
4( )
c c
I
H Fa D
H Fc Fa
f f + ++ <
+ +
 ( )41
4( )
a c c a
I I
H Fc Fa Fa D
H Fc Fa
f f f f
+ + + +
+ + + <
+ +
 
Hxp-type   NA 2 2 1
2 2 8 6 1 2
a
c c
I
H Fc Fa
H Fc Fa D
f
f f
+ + +
<
+ + + + +
 1 2( )
1 2 2
a c c a
I I
a
H Fc Fa Fa D
H Fc Fa
f f f f
j
+ + + + + + +
<
+ + +
 
v-type    NA 1
1 2 3( )
a c c a
I I
c c
I
H Fc Fa Fa D
H Fc Fa Fa D
f f f f
f f
+ + + + + + +
<
+ + + + + +
 
Vxp-type     NA 
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f. Numerical solutions 
We incorporate the difference in iceberg trade costs between components and assembly. While 1+t 
units need to be shipped to deliver 1 unit of assembled products, 1+αt units need to be shipped out to 
deliver 1 unit of components. We assume here 0<α<1, i.e., the iceberg trade cost of components is 
cheaper than that of assembled products. We adopt this assumption for two reasons. First, this 
assumption sounds reasonable because freights for components are considered to be generally 
cheaper than that of assembled goods, e.g., engines or chassis versus final cars. Moreover, it is widely 
known that tariffs are generally lower for intermediate goods than final goods (Olsen’s asymmetry). 
Secondly, in this symmetric model, firms’ choices come from the trade-off between ‘decomposition 
(or unbundling)’ costs incorporated as an additional fixed cost versus lower trade cost of components. 
Thus, unless 0<α<1, ‘decomposition’ never pays off. So, c af f> , c aI If f> .  
We draw a picture of modes of supply in the space of freeness of trade to obtain a testable hypothesis 
about the relationship between the freeness of trade and the modes of supply. The empirical study in 
the next section tests the hypothesis.  
The area of n-type is the one which simultaneously solves the inequality conditions of the four 
conditions in the first row of Table 1, which correspond to the equations (A6), (A8), (A12) and (A13). 
Similarly, we can find the area of each mode of supply by simultaneous inequality conditions derived 
above. There are four types of freeness of trade in our model, , , ,a c a cI If f f f . To yield figures in two 
dimensions, we assume , ;0 1a c a cI If rf f rf r= = < < . Figure 2 is a numerical solution for one set of 
parameters. This is the case where all the five modes of supply are within the choice set. Obviously, 
depending on the parameter values, the picture changes. For example, when ρ takes a high number, 
such as 0.8, neither v-type nor Vxp-type is within the choice set because the merit of transporting 
components instead of assembly is small. In Figure 2, when either intra-regional freeness of trade af  
or inter-regional freeness of trade aIf  is high, firms choose export platform FDI. This qualitative 
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feature does not change depending on the parameter values although the size of area for each mode of 
supply does change. 
g. Intuition 
Intuition is straightforward. At a low af  (intra-regional freeness of trade) and a low aIf  
(inter-regional freeness of trade) such as A in Figure 2, both of intra-regional trade costs and 
inter-regional trade costs are high. Thus, it is optimal for firms to avoid transportation both between 
regions and within regions and set up component and assembly plants in each country, i.e., horizontal 
FDI (m-type). As the point moves from A to B, aIf  becomes larger while 
af  stays low, thus it 
becomes optimal to take advantage of low inter-regional trade costs and export to the other countries 
from the home country, i.e., n(national)-type. As the point moves from B to C, af  becomes higher. 
Because a high af  is associated with a high cf  by the parameter ρ ( ;0 1a cf rf r= < < ) as above7, 
with a sufficiently low value of ρ and D (the decomposition cost) (in the case of Figure 2, ρ=0.5 and 
D=0.2), it pays for firms to decompose the production process and transport components across 
regions. Thus, the optimal choice is vertical export platform FDI (Vxp-type). On the way from B to C 
at intermediate af ,  there is an area for vertical FDI (v-type), in which it pays to decompose the 
production process because of a sufficiently low D, but does not pay to transport the assembled goods 
(final goods) within regions because af  is not sufficiently high. When the point moves from A to D, 
af  becomes larger while aIf  stays low, thus it becomes optimal to make use of low intra-regional 
trade costs and to choose horizontal export platform FDI (Hxp-type). Finally, the movement from D 
to C (from Hxp-type to Vxp-type) comes from a high aIf  combined with a sufficiently low value of ρ 
and D as explained above. 
 
                                                 
7 It may be easier to understand this point by transforming the equation to ;0 1a cf r f r= < < . 
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Figure 2: Modes of supply in the space of inter-regional freeness of trade ( aIf ) and 
intra-regional freeness of trade ( af ) 
 
Parameter values: H=1, Fa=0.1, Fc=0.2, D=0.2, ρ=0.5 
  
3. DATA, EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 
We use US FDI data from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We have chosen US data 
because the US is the largest FDI home country and also the US BEA makes the detailed and 
long-period data publicly available.  
a. Descriptive Analysis 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of US FDI stock for the top 20 host countries in terms of its FDI stock in 
2008. The United Kingdom is the largest US FDI recipient, having much higher stock amount than 
the second largest recipient, the Netherlands. To examine the evolution of the other 19 countries more 
closely, Figure 4 shows the same data excluding the United Kingdom. Countries with strong 
economic ties with the US, such as Canada, Japan and European countries have registered steady 
A 
B 
D 
C 
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increases in FDI stock. Drastic increases in US FDI stock in the Netherlands, Luxembourg and 
Ireland stand out. The evolution of third country export ratios are in Figure 5. The ratio for the largest 
US FDI recipient, the United Kingdom, is in the range of 20 to 25%. Luxembourg and Switzerland 
have the highest ratios ranging from 60% to 80%. Ireland has also a high ratio at the range between 
60% and 70%. The ratios of the Netherlands and Belgium are relatively stable at around 55%. The 
lowest ratios are for Canada and Japan at less than 10%. We notice here that countries that have 
received the highest amount of US FDI, except the UK, show high ratios. This can be said especially 
for EU countries.  
Figure 3: The evolution of US FDI stock of the top 20 recipient countries, 1983-2008 
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Figure 4: The evolution of US FDI stock of the top 20 recipient countries except UK, 1983-2008 
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Figure 5: The evolution of the third country export ratio of the top 20 US FDI recipient 
countries, 1983-2008 
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b. Econometric Analysis 
We estimate the following equation.  
, 0 1 , 2 , 3 4 5 ,c t c t c t c tFDIforThirdCountryExports MarketPotential TradeCost RTA Y Hb b b b b b e= + + + + + +% % %
 
where ,c tFDIforThirdCountyExports  is the US FDI stock multiplied by the third country export ratio 
of host country c at time t. ,c tMarketPotential  is the market potential values of Mayer (2008)
8 of 
host country c at time t. We use this variable as a major explanatory variable instead of other variables 
such as GDP of host countries, since, when choosing locations of their plants, firms look not only at 
the domestic market of host countries but also at the potential demand coming from the host countries’ 
neighbours.9 ,c tTradeCost  is the ratio of trade related cost over goods’ value for host country c at 
time t.10 Details for its computation is in Appendix B. This variable corresponds to aIf , inter-regional 
freeness of trade, in the above theoretical model, because it is the trade cost between the US and the 
host country. RTA  is a vector of Regional Trade Agreement dummy. Those dummies are EU 
dummy, MERCOSUR dummy, ASEAN dummy and NAFTA dummy. This variable corresponds to 
af , intra-regional freeness of trade, because RTA enhances the freeness of trade. Y is a vector of year 
dummies. H is a vector of host country dummies. dt ,e  is an iid error. The variables of our interest 
are ,c tTradeCost and RTA , while the others are control variables. In the above theoretical model, 
market sizes are assumed to be constant. However, the actual data must be reflecting the influence of 
market sizes. Thus, by including the variable, ,c tMarketPotential , we are controlling market sizes. 
All the variables except dummy variables are in natural log. The data covers the years from 1983 to 
2003. The starting year of 1983 comes from the constraint of US FDI data while the end year of 2003 
                                                 
8 I thank Thierry Mayer for kindly sharing with me the market potential data he constructed.  
9 Being inspired by the idea of “market potential” by Harris (1954), Head and Mayer (2004) and 
Mayer (2008) have estimated “market potential” using equations they derived from the New 
Economic Geography. 
10 We compute trade costs as above so that it captures the real trade cost, including transportation, 
tariff, and insurance, instead of using distance, which does not have variation over time. 
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comes from the availability of the Market Potential data. Fifty eight countries available from the US 
FDI data are included. The list of countries is in Appendix C.  
c. Results 
Table 2 shows the estimation results. The first column gives the results using the whole data. There is 
an issue worth being considered. The location choice of natural resource seeking FDI hinges on the 
availability of natural resources, not on the possibility of third country exports. While we do not have 
the third country export data by industry as mentioned above, we do have FDI stock data by industry, 
at least for recent years. Thus, we have run the second regression excluding US FDI recipient 
countries whose share of mining sector in the total US FDI stock exceeds 50% in the year 2003, the 
last year of the data for the regression. The mining sector includes Oil and Gas Extraction, Coal 
Mining, Metal Mining, etc.11 The third column gives results when we exclude more countries by 
setting the cut-off point at 25%.  
As specification tests, we have run pooled regression and panel regression and performed Likelihood 
ratio test. The likelihood ratio test has rejected the null hypothesis of no systematic difference 
between pooled regression and panel regressions, leading us to go with the panel. Among the panel 
regressions, we have performed Hausman tests and chosen between fixed effects or random effects 
according to the test results.12  
In all three cases, the coefficient estimates for the market potential variable is positive and statistically 
significant, indicating one percent increase of market potential is associated with an increase of 0.248 
to 0.319 percent of “FDI stock for third country exports”. The trade cost variable captures 
inter-regional freeness of trade between the US and the recipient countries. Its coefficient estimates 
are negative and statistically significant in all three cases, indicating that a one percent increase in 
trade cost is associated with 0.266 to 0.298 percent decrease of “FDI stock for third country exports”. 
                                                 
11 Industry classification with which the data are available is NAICS 2002. 
12 The first column is Fixed Effects model, while the second and the third columns are Random 
Effects model. 
 21 
This is equivalent to saying: one percent increase in inter-regional freeness of trade is associated with 
0.266 to 0.298 percent increase in “FDI stock for third country exports”. This result sits well with the 
theoretical prediction shown above. Namely, as aIf  gets larger (given a sufficiently high level of 
af ), 
firms choose (Vertical) export platform FDI13. The other variable of our interest, Regional Trade 
Agreement dummies, i.e., EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN, NAFTA dummies show different coefficient 
estimates. The EU dummy exhibits large positive coefficient estimates with high statistical 
significance in all three cases. The MERCOSUR dummy also shows positive coefficient estimates 
with statistical significance in all three cases. And the numbers are not negligible. The ASEAN 
dummy’s drastic change from the first column to the second and the third columns comes from the 
exclusion of Indonesia. Indonesia ranks 24 out of 57 countries and has a high third country export 
ratio. The mean of third country export ratio of Indonesia is 45.3%. Thus, the first column’s large 
positive statistically significant coefficient can be interpreted as an Indonesia effect. Once we 
exclude Indonesia, whose share of mining sector is 65.6%, the coefficient estimates become 
statistically insignificant. As to the NAFTA dummy, given no large third country neighbours of 
Canada and Mexico, a statistically insignificant coefficient estimate of NAFTA dummy is not 
surprising. 
Table 2: Estimation results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Whole Data Mining Excluded1 Mining Excluded2 
Market Potential 0.248* 0.319*** 0.289** 
 (0.012) (0.000) (0.002) 
Trade Cost -0.266** -0.298*** -0.298** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
EU 0.737*** 0.807*** 0.792*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
                                                 
13 Here, we put the word “vertical” into the parenthesis because the third country export data do not 
distinguish between vertical and horizontal FDI. This is unfortunate because a contribution of this 
paper on theoretical side is the model construction which includes both of horizontal and vertical FDI. 
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MERCOSUR 0.374* 0.387* 0.382* 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.042) 
ASEAN 3.077*** 0.658 0.562 
 (0.000) (0.369) (0.449) 
NAFTA -0.309 -0.378 -0.357 
 (0.128) (0.061) (0.076) 
Constant 2.575 1.313 1.761 
 (0.052) (0.252) (0.137) 
N 946 881 838 
p-values in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
(2) Mining excluded 1: Excluded countries are Nigeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Norway 
(3) Mining excluded 2: Excluded countries are Nigeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Norway, Peru, Russia, Ecuador, United Arab 
Emirates 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper contributes a model that accounts for “export platform” FDI – a form of FDI that is 
common in the data but rarely discussed in the theoretical literature. Unlike the previous literature, 
this paper’s theory nests all the typical modes of supply, including exports, horizontal and vertical 
FDI, horizontal and vertical export platform FDI. The theory yields the testable hypothesis that a 
decrease in inter-regional or intra-regional trade costs induces firms to choose the export platform 
FDI. The empirical part of the paper provides descriptive statistics, which point to large proportions 
of third country exports of US FDI, and an econometric analysis, whose results are in line with the 
model’s predictions. A strong positive impact of the EU dummy on the export platform FDI suggests 
policy implications for nations seeking to attract FDI More precisely, the easier access to third 
countries’ markets brought about by regional trade agreements shows to be a strong determinant of 
the locational decisions of US firms. This shows a non-obvious rarely mentioned benefit of smaller 
countries joining RTAs. 
This paper abstracts away from the issue of cost difference for the sake of constructing a 
parsimonious model, and as a result, focus on the proximity-concentration trade-off with unbundling 
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costs. This model may well explain the export platform FDI in EU countries, but is not suitable to 
account for the export platform FDI inflows to developing countries, such as Japanese FDI into 
Mexico, where the motive of production cost saving must be involved. To incorporate production 
cost motive or construct another model for that purpose is a future work to be done. 
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Appendix A:  
Operating profit 
Firm k in county i maximizes 
 ( )k k k ki i i ip c qp = -  (A1) 
where p , c , q  represent price, marginal cost, and quantity respectively. The first order condition 
yields the Lerner condition.  
 ( )1 1k k ki i ip ce- =  (A2) 
where kie  is the firm’s perceived elasticity of demand. 
Plugging (A2) into (A1) gives  
 k k k ki i i ip qp e=  (A3) 
Denoting the firm’s market share as k k ki i i is p q Rº  where iR  is market size of country i, (A3) 
becomes 
 k k ki i i is Rp e=  (A4) 
Assuming that each firm’s perceived elasticity of demand depends only on the market share of the 
firm, k ki ise e é ù= ë û , (A4) becomes  
 k k ki i i is R sp e é ù= ë û  (A5) 
Derivation of the “erosion” effect 
Without τ, we have  
/pqp e=
 Because of the Dixit-Stiglitz CES utility function, with τ, the equilibrium sales quantity is:  
1
1
Eq p
P
s s
st
- -
-=  
Plugging this into the above operating profit yields,  
 27 
1
1
Ep p
P
s s
sp t e
- -
-= ×  
With the assumption of identical firms, this becomes: 
1 1
1
Ep
P
s s
sp t s
- -
-=  
Since 
1 1 1
1 1 1
1p p p
P p np n
s s s
s s s
- - -
- - -= = =å
 due to identical firms, and also because 
pxs
E
º  
Since E npx=  due to identical firms,  
1pxs
npx n
= =  
Thus,  
1 sEsp t s-=  
Since 1 sf t -º , sEp f s=     q.e.d. 
 
Assuming the cost function, 
c wz=  
where w  is wage and z  is intermediate inputs. 
If we transport final goods, the marginal cost becomes ( )ac wzt= . And the above derivation applies. 
If we transport intermediate goods, the cost becomes ( )( )a cc w zt t= . 
Due to the multiplicative term, the operating profit becomes a csEp f f s=  
 
Derivation of the boundary conditions 
Between n-type and m-type 
The equilibrium condition of firms choosing n-type instead of m-type is that n-type yields zero profits 
while m-type yields negative profits. Thus, the boundary condition can be found as14:  
)(//// FaFcHRSRSRSSR aI
a
I
an ++-+++=P sjsjsjs =0 
                                                 
14 The only endogenous variable in the equations is market share S. So, we solve the equality condition for S and then by plugging this S into the 
inequality condition, we can find the boundary condition, which is the relationship between the parameters, f ,H,Fc,Fa. 
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0)(/)21( =++-++Û FaFcHSR aI
a sjj  
Solving for S,  
)21(
)(
a
I
aR
FaFcHS
jj
s
++
++
=Û  
Plugging this into the inequality condition of mP , 
0))(4(
)21(
)(4 <++-
++
++
=P FaFcHR
R
FaFcH
a
I
a
m
sjj
s  
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4( )
a a
I
H
H Fc Fa
f fÛ + >
+ +
 (A6) 
Analogously, the boundary conditions of other pairs of modes of supply are:  
Between m-type and Hxp-type 
 
4( )
a H
H Fc Fa
f <
+ +
 (A7) 
Between n-type and v-type 
 1 2 3( )
1 2
c c
I
a a
I
H Fc Fa Fa D
H Fc Fa
f f
f f
+ + + + + +
<
+ + + +
 (A8) 
Between v-type and Vxp-type 
 1
1 2 3( )
a c c a
I I
c c
I
H Fc Fa Fa D
H Fc Fa Fa D
f f f f
f f
+ + + + + + +
<
+ + + + + +
 (A9) 
Between m-type and v-type 
 3( 4( ))2
4( )
c c
I
H Fa D
H Fc Fa
f f + ++ <
+ +
 (A10) 
Between v-type and Hxp-type 
 1 2 2
1 2 2 2 8 6
a
c c
I
H Fc Fa
H Fc Fa D
f
f f
+ + +
<
+ + + + +
 (A11) 
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Between n-type and Hxp-type 
 1
1 2 2( )
a
a a
I
H Fc Fa Fc Fa
H Fc Fa
f
f f
+ + + + +
<
+ + + +
 (A12) 
Between n-type and Vxp-type 
 1
1 2
a c c a
I I
a a
I
H Fc Fa Fa D
H Fc Fa
f f f f
f f
+ + + + + + +
<
+ + + +
 (A13) 
Between m-type and Vxp-type 
 ( )41
4( )
a c c a
I I
H Fc Fa Fa D
H Fc Fa
f f f f
+ + + +
+ + + <
+ +
 (A14) 
Between Hxp-type and Vxp-type 
 1 2( )
1 2 2
a c c a
I I
a
H Fc Fa Fa D
H Fc Fa
f f f f
f
+ + + + + + +
<
+ + +
 (A15) 
 
Appendix B:  
We have used US import data provided by The Center for International Data at UC Davis. The 
variable “charge” in the data represents trade related costs except import duty. For the years prior to 
1989, the data do not include “charge”. Thus, we have computed the “charge” as “cifvalue” minus 
“cusvalue”, i.e., CIF value – FOB value. Since the data are at 7 or 10 digit product code depending on 
years, we have computed total “cusvalue”, total “charge” and total “duty” by summing over product 
codes for each pair of years and partner countries. Finally we defined the trade cost as the total 
“charge” + total “duty” divided by the total “cusvalue”. 
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Appendix C:  
US FDI econometric analysis, List of countries 
ArgentinaGreece Panama
AustraliaGuatemala Peru
Austria Honduras Philippines
Bahamas Hong Kong Poland
Barbados Hungary Russia
Belgium India Saudi Arabia
Bermuda Indonesia Singapore
Brazil Ireland South Africa
Canada Israel Spain
Chile Italy Sweden
China Jamaica Switzerland
Colombia Japan Thailand
Costa RicaKorea, Republic ofTrin dad and Tobago
Czech RepublicMalaysia Turkey
Denmark Mexico United Arab Emirates
Ecuador NetherlandsUnited Kingdom
Egypt Netherlands AntillesVenezue a
Finland New Zealand
France Nigeria
Germany Norway  
 
